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Some Ethical Principles for Adult 
Critical Care 
Kenneth Kipnis PhD, Anita Gerhard MD 
State of the art in approaching several of the most disturbing 
problems involving end-of-life decision-making in an intensive 
care setting is applicable to other contexts as well. Developed 
as part of the curriculum at the John A. Burns School of Medicine 
at the University of Hawaii, the material is intended as a reflection 
of current work in health care ethics, strongly supported by 
literature, and generally consistent with current legal trends. But 
it also has developed into something of a consensus document, 
having been widely circulated in various versions, repeatedly 
presented to professional audiences dozens of times in Hawaii, 
and improved by countless comments and suggestions. The 
focus here is on the standards for withholding and withdrawing 
treatment. It should be noted that some important types of ethical 
problems are not covered: In particular, scarce resource prob-
lems (including some related questions involving medical futil-
ity), maternal-fetal and pediatric issues, and questions involving 
the notification of potentially affected third parties. 
Decisionally Capacitated Patients 
For decisionally capacitated patients, it can be axiomatic that 
health care professionals must secure informed consent prior to 
treatment. There is almost no debate about this issue. The little 
discussion is occurring only at the distant margins-refusals by 
pregnant women and patients with MDR TB. And even in these 
cases it cannot be said there is a consensus that contradicts the 
axiom. In essence, where informed consent has been withheld or 
withdrawn, health care professionals, lacking needed permis-
sion, are not at liberty to treat. Refusals of treatment by 
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decisionally capacitated, informed adults are decisive: Rela-
tives and health care professionals have no ethical or legal 
authority to overturn their medical decisions. 
Competency and Decisional Capacity 
All adults are presumed to be competent and decisionally 
capacitated. This assumption is rebuttable. In this context, the 
term "incompetency" must be distinguished from "decisional 
incapacitation," by far the more useful of the two concepts. The 
former is a legal status that is imposed by courts. A judge, 
generally following the testimony of a psychiatrist, can find an 
adult to be legally incompetent and will therefore appoint a 
guardian who is empowered to make decisions on behalf of the 
adult, now a ward. Judicial declarations of incompetency are 
rarely required in the ICU. On the other hand, capacity and 
incapacity are action-specific concepts that are often clinically 
applicable. As regards some health-care decision, a patient is 
sufficiently capacitated to make that particular decision if, at a 
minimum, he or she has the capacities 1) to understand the 
problem, 2) to understand the risks and benefits of the available 
alternatives (including no treatment), and 3) to express a choice. 
It is possible for a legally incompetent patient-for example, a 
mature minor-to be decisionally capacitated. Likewise, a com-
petent patient may be decisionally incapacitated, as when a 
patient is in denial about the medical problem. 
Informed Consent 
Consistent with this analysis of decisional capacity as a mini-
mum standard, a patient is sufficiently informed to give in-
formed consent if he or she: 
1. Understands the medical problem, 
2. understands what the health care professional proposes to 
do, 
3. understands the available alternatives, including no treat-
ment, and 
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4. understands the risks and benefits attaching to each of 
these alternatives. 
What counts as a risk and what counts as a benefit is based on 
the patient's values. A facial scar can have one assessment to a 
fashion model and quite another to a Prussian military officer. 
Ethically and legally, informed consent is at the heart of the 
relationship between health care professionals and patients. The 
question is not whether the heath care professional has accu-
rately set out the facts but, rather, whether the patient has 
understood. Informed consent is a process of patient education 
and assessment of the patient's knowledge. The underlying 
condition is explained the options, and the risks and benefits 
attaching to each option (including the option of no treatment). 
Time is allowed for questions and the patient's comprehension 
is tested, going back over what has not been understood, and then 
reassessing comprehension. Contrary to the opinion of many, 
the signature on the form is not the informed consent but merely 
rebuttable evidence that this process has been successfully 
carried out. In giving informed consent, a patient assumes a 
measure of responsibility for the decision to implement the 
medical procedure and gives health care professionals permis-
sion to carry it out. 
The Patient's Values 
Decisional capacity is often said by commentators to require, in 
addition to 1 to 4 above: 
5. some relatively stable set of personal values and 
6. the capacity to employ reason in applying these values to 
situations. 
This higher standard is met when the patient can, so to speak, 
"tell a story" in which the decision, under the circumstances, 
makes sense against the background of his or her personal 
values. In assessing decisional capacity it may sometimes be 
appropriate to explore the patient's values and how these have 
been applied to the medical alternatives. Where, for example, a 
patient is rejecting a relatively non-burdensome intervention 
that promises significant subjective advantages, it is permissible 
to seek to understand the patient's values, stability, and how 
these are being applied. A simple and effective way of determin-
ing whether conditions 5 and 6 are met is to ask: "Please help me 
understand why you are making this decision." 
In seeking to understand how the patient's decision is sup-
ported by the reasoned application Of relatively stable values, it 
is important that health care professionals be able to honor the 
patient's values, even if these are very different from their own. 
Caution should be exercised to ensure that the standard of 
rationality that is applied to the patient is not outcome-based; ie, 
not set so high that only agreement with the physician's recom-
mendation could count as adequate evidence of decisional 
capacity. 
Determinations of Capacity 
Ideally, determinations of decisional capacity (minimum stan-
dard) should be made and charted before the patient is asked to 
express a choice. If, however, there are questions about the 
reasoned nature of the choice-as when the patient is refusing 
low-burden, high-benefit treatment-it is recommended to ask 
th~ patient to explain why he or she has chosen that alternative: 
"Please help me understand why you want to do this." But the 
willingness to respond to such questioning is not a prerequisite 
for honoring consent in an adult patient. (The ability to respond 
-
coherently to such questions, however, might be relevant in 
rebutting a minor's presumed incapacitation.) Referrals to the 
hospital ethics committee and/or an ethics consultation (where 
available) are advised in enigmatic refusal cases, where patients 
are unwilling to reveal their reasons for refusing treatment. 
Psychiatric consults are appropriate to determine whether a 
psychological state, such as the adoption of unusual beliefs or a 
shift in personal values, is traceable to mental illness. But note 
that mental illness calls decisional capacity into question only 
when it directly affects the patient's decision. A diagnosis of 
mental illness is not the same as a determination of decisional 
incapacity, for mental illness can preserve capacity in some 
areas while compromising it in others. Accordingly patients 
with psychiatric symptoms and/or diagnoses may well be 
decisionally capacitated. However conditions such as dementia, 
delirium, depression, mania, and delusions specific to treatment 
may well call decisional capacitation into question. 
Decisionally Incapacitated Patients 
Decisionally capacitated patients have the ethical standing to 
make medical treatment choices on their own. The discussion 
above sets out what are essentially standard criteria for distin-
guishing between patients who are decisionally capacitated in 
this sense and those who aren't. Where patients are found to be 
decisionally incapacitated, the literature is again fairly consis-
tent in recommending a three-step process. First, determine if 
there is an advance directive. Second, if unable to obtain an 
advance directive, endeavor to apply the "substituted judgment 
test" (See below). And third, in the event that the substituted 
judgment test cannot be applied, apply the "best interests" test. 
In all of these cases, the ideal is to approximate, as well as 
possible, the patient's own autonomous decision. 
Advance Directives 
Where an adult patient has lost decisional capacity, medical 
decisions should be made, ideally, in accordance with some 
previously executed advance directive: A living will or a durable 
power of attorney. Advance directives are indicated where: 
a) incapacitation is anticipated (eg, Alzheimer's disease) 
and/or 
b) conflicts are anticipated with or within the patient's 
family. 
Neither relatives nor health care professionals have the legal or 
ethical power to countermand the provisions in an advance 
directive. 
Advance directives are fundamentally of two types. There is 
the "living will" containing instructions for medical treatment in 
the event the patient becomes incapacitated. The document 
specifies some set of medically determinable conditions (Two 
common ones are "in the event that I am terminally ill" and "in 
the event that I have lost the capacity to participate in medical 
treatment decisions with no reasonable expectation of regaining 
that capacity") and a set of instructions to follow when it is 
determined that the listed condition or conditions obtain. And 
there is the "durable power of attorney" which delegates the 
authority to make medical treatment decisions to some third 
party who is required to act in accordance with the patient's 
values. (See the discussion below on the "substituted judgment 
test." Sometimes the two documents are combined, including 
instructions, as living wills do, but also designating a proxy 
decision-maker in the event it become unclear how the instruc-
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tions are to be interpreted. 
Where a physician has personal reservations about carrying 
out its provisions, the care of the patient should be transferred in 
a timely way to a physician who can give effect to the patient's 
decision. Health care professionals should be aware that the 
provisions of advance directives may vary. These should be 
studied with care. 
The "Substituted Judgment" Test 
Where a patient who has lost decisional capacity lacks an 
advance directive, medical decisions should be made in accor-
dance with the "substituted judgment" test. It is critical, in 
discussions with the patient's friends and family, to frame the 
question properly. Those who have been close to the patient 
should be asked for information about the patient's hopes, 
beliefs, values, goals, concerns, etc, with the intention of iden-
tifying the course of action that the patient would have chosen 
under the existing circumstances. 
It is a good idea to begin a family conference by specifying that 
the concern is to try to reach agreement about the best decision 
rather than determine who has the right to decide. If everyone 
can agree about what is the right thing to do, there is no need to 
reach the question of who is the one to decide. Note that relatives 
should not be asked for their decision nor should they be asked 
about their own preferences. They should instead be asked for 
specific information that can assist in reaching a shared under-
standing of how the patient would have made the decision. 
The conversation should focus exclusively on what those 
assembled know about the patient: The stories, the quotes, the 
insights into the patient's deepest commitments. "Did he or she 
ever say anything about how these decisions should be made or 
about how these problems should be approached?" Only after 
these issues have been amply explored-with everyone having 
had a chance to contribute and hear what others have to say-it 
should be asked, "How can we best respect what this person 
stood for?" Using this approach, medical decisions should 
reflect the patient's values, as these are discerned by those who 
have been closest to the patient, those best situated to be able to 
report reliably on what those values were. On some occasions, 
but only when this approach has failed, relatives and friends may 
be polled on the question of which person is the one the patient 
would have been most likely to entrust with such a decision. 
Conversations very like this are also appropriate where there 
is a proxy decision-maker who has been designated by a durable 
power of attorney. Though, in these cases, the designated proxy 
does have a right to decide, he or she is still required to make that 
decision in the light of the patient's expressed values. Hence the 
exchange of information can be essential in confirming what 
those values were. 
The Best Interests Test 
When a decisionally incapacitated patient has no advance direc-
tive and where information is not available about how the patient 
would have decided either the patient has never been capaci-
tated or is a "John Doe"-medical decisions should be made 
using the "best interests" test. For never-capacitated patients, it 
often makes sense to ask, "What do we know of this patient's 
sensitivities?" (Warmth, comfort, freedom from pain, etc.) For 
formerly capacitated patients it can be helpful to ask, "What 
would the reasonable person in the patient's position choose?" 
These cases should be referred to the hospital ethics committee. 
Contraindicated Treatment 
Above All, Do No Harm 
The ethical principle, Above all, do no harm, prohibits the 
imposition of burdensome medical treatment that is not ex-
pected to provide the patient with any subjective benefit. This 
principle is most likely to be violated when relatives and other 
decision-makers are given too free a hand in medical 
decision-making. Guilt and denial may compel relatives to press 
for aggressive treatment that the patient is known not to have 
wanted. Attention to the standards set out in the substitued 
judgment test can prevent this from occurring. 
Medical Futility 
There is no ethical obligation to commence or to continue futile 
treatment modalities, procedures that are not expected to pro-
vide the patient with any subjective benefit. Questions of medi-
cal futility can arise when patients and families are in agreement 
that "everything" should be done. In these cases it is critical that 
patients and families are clear about what outcomes can and 
cannot be expected as a consequence of aggressive treatment. 
The focus should be shifted away from the treatment modalities 
that are available to the outcomes that can be reasonably ex-
pected to flow from those treatments. (See Competency and 
Decisional Capacity: Minimum standard for informed consent.) 
Most cultures have venerable rituals associated with death: 
Ceremonies that acknowledge the importance of the person who 
is dying and that solemnize the seriousness of the occasion. It is 
unfortunate that health care settings are often prepared to re-
spond to familial apprehension only by imposing medical treat-
ment: A kind of high-tech shamanism. What may be more 
appropriate to families is intensive spiritual care; a mobilization 
of social support systems that can assist the family through its 
loss and transition. 
Psychiatric consults may be indicated if, for example, denial 
or some other delusion specific to a treatment decision is playing 
a role in the demand for futile treatment. Consultation with an 
institutional Ethics Committee may also be appropriate in cases 
where patients and families persist in demanding treatments that 
do not promise benefits that are subjectively valued by the 
patient. 
Withdrawal and Withholding of Life Support 
Where a treatment modality is not owed to the patient (where 
consent has been withdrawn or where the procedure is not 
expected, on balance, to provide a benefit to the patient) this 
treatment modality may be withdrawn or withheld. The same 
conditions that justify withholding treatment also justify with-
drawing it. There is no presumption that, once begun, no matter 
how futile, life-sustaining medical procedures must be contin-
ued. The maintenance of organic life is not, in and of itself, a 
benefit to the patient. "Benefit" here is to be understood as 
relative to the patient's values, as discussed in Decisionally 
Capacitated Patients. Note that the decision to withdraw or 
withhold life support is not a decision to abandon the patient. 
Other treatment modalities, especially pain control and comfort 
care ("aggressive palliative care"), may be required. 
Brain Death 
Therapeutic treatment modalities are decisively contraindicated 
for all patients who are dead, including patients who are "brain 
dead." It is generally unwise to use the expression "brain dead" 
-
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with patients' families as the state that is referred to is not one of 
qualified death. The patient should be described as having died, 
adding that some of the bodily organs are being supported 
mechanically in case they may be used for transplants. It is not 
appropriate to ask relatives for permission to disconnect support 
equipment in these cases. After death has occurred, that which 
used to be the body of the patient can be kept on organ support-
not life support-until organs usable for transplant purposes are 
harvested or until it is established that consent to harvest the 
organs is not available. 
The Decision to Withdraw 
Tube Feeding 
Joy F. Murakami MD, Warren F. Wong MD 
Physicians involved in the care of elderly patients are often faced 
with end-of-life decisions including withholding or withdrawal of 
tube feeding. More than 80% of deaths take place in the hospital 
or nursing home and the prolongation of life by medical technol-
ogy has replaced natural processes. 1 We believe the availability 
of life-sustaining medical technology including tube feeding 
does not make physicians ethically obligated to use it once it is 
known that health and function cannot be restored and the 
burdens outweigh the benefits. Patients and their surrogate 
decision-makers have a right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment they find burdensome. Tube feeding as a medical 
treatment, withholding of tube feeding as equivalent to with-
drawal of tube feeding, the benefits versus the burdens of tube 
feeding, and the decision-making process involved in the with-
drawal of medical treatment are considered Hawaii's statutes as 
they apply to decision-making and examples of cases to illus-
trate how these concepts are pertinent to patients whom we 
encounter in clinical practice are discussed. 
Tube Feeding as a Medical Treatment 
Some individuals view enteral feeding as basic supportive care 
that is ethically obligatory, and therefore, should not be withheld 
or withdrawn. The provision of food and water is believed to be 
symbolic of caring, comfort, and compassion.3 
However, the majority ethical and legal position at this time is 
to regard enteral and parental nutrition and hydration as 
life-sustaining medical treatment with proportionate benefits 
and burdens that must be assessed individually from the per-
spective of the patient. As with all other forms of medical 
treatment, tube feeding can be refused or might not be appropri-
ate. It is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed 
consent prior to the initiation of tube feeding. Over the last 
decade there have been numerous court cases supporting the 
right of the competent individual to refuse life-sustaining tube 
feeding and have expanded this legal concept to include incom-
petent individuals and individuals not imminently dying (pa-
tients who are in persistent vegetative states or who are very 
debilitated). 1-3 In 1990, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing in 
a concurring opinion for the United States Supreme Court in the 
Cruzan case, stated unequivocally that artificial feeding should 
be considered a form of medical intervention. 4 Despite emerging 
legal consensus, in several states feeding tubes are explicitly 
excluded from the types oflife-prolonging treatment that may be 
rejected in an advance directive such as a living will. Since July 
of 1991, Hawaii's statute has explicitly addressed whether the 
declarant wants or does not want tube feeding. Patients should, 
therefore, have an updated declaration. 
Tube feeding is a medical treatment, but we contend that all 
health care treatments, whether regarded as basic supportive 
care or medical intervention, are subject to a benefit/burden 
analysis and can be accepted or rejected by an adequately 
informed patient or surrogate decision-maker. 
Withholding Versus Withdrawal of Tube 
Feeding 
Decisions concerning initiation, withholding and withdrawal of 
life-sustaining enteral nutrition are very difficult to make. There 
is not always a clear sense of whether to start tube feedings. 
When the prognosis Is not clear and there is evidence to suggest 
that nutritional support can help a person regain health and 
function or allow time to recover, the more prudent decision is 
to initiate a time-limited trial of tube feeding. Tube feeding can 
be withdrawn when it becomes clear thattherapy is not effective, 
or that the burdens of prolonging life with tube feeding outweigh 
the benefits,5 or when the patient's prognosis or wishes have 
been clarified. 
Ethicists and the courts equate the act of withdrawing a 
treatment with the act of withholding a treatment once the 
appropriate individuals have reached a decision. If withdrawing 
a treatment is considered more problematic than withholding 
one, physicians will withhold treatments when they are uncer-
tain as to their benefit, rather than risk not being able to withdraw 
the treatment later.4 This denies many patients potentially ben-
eficial treatments. 
Many health care providers believe it is psychologically and 
emotionally more difficult to withdraw treatment rather than 
-
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